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DEMOCRATIZATION AS A SPIRITUAL-MORAL EVENT: 
A STUDY OF EAST GERMAN THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL RHETORIC 
by John P. Burgess 
Dr. John P. Burgess (Presbyterian) is the Associate for Theological Studies in the 
Presbyterian Church (USA) headquarters in Louisville, Kentucky. He was a professor 
of religion at Coe College. He received his doctorate from University of Chicago and 
studied for over a year in the former G.D.R. An article of his was published in 
OPREE, Vol. VIII, No. 6 (November 1988). 
It is already becoming academically fashionable to argue that the recent, radical changes 
in Leninist states were historically "inevitable." At the time, however, the events beginning 
with the "New Thinking" of Mikhail Gorbachev and coming to symbolic climax in the 
dismantling of the Berlin Wall took the entire world by surprise, most especially the people 
living under "communism." 
Scholarly theories of democratization have proved problematic in explaining this 
unexpected fragility of Leninist regimes. Zbigniew Brzezinski, for example, argued that 
democratization of Leninist states would occur as their inefficient, command-structure 
economies faltered. Yet, Brzezinski's economic determinism is finally unpersuasive. Writing 
in 1988, he predicted that countries such as economically-strong East Germany would be 
among the last to experience democratization.1 Indeed, his model is more generally 
problematic because the depth of economic crisis in Leninist states tends to remain unclear 
until well after the democratization movements successfully challenge the Communist Party's 
monopoly on power. 
Other political scientists have focused on cultural factors. Ralf Dahrendorf has suggested 
that democratization depends on the rebuilding of civil society, i.e., autonomous, 
intermediate institutions that allow people to participate in shaping society. Leninist states 
1 Zbigniew Brezinski, The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Scribner, 1989), 234,249 
maintain themselves by destroying civil society.2 Yet, Dahrendorf's reasoning proves 
circular; one could as well argue that the rebuilding of civil society depends on 
democratization. He does not account for the rise of opposition, reform movements that seek 
to r.ebuild civil society in Leninist states, nor for the fact that this rebuilding of civil society 
appears to unleash not only democratic forces but also ones seeking to reclaim primordial 
identities, in association with new forms of authoritarian· nationalism.3 
Yet other scholars, such as Samuel Huntington, have emphasized that, besides economic 
and cultural preconditions, certain political factors are necessary to the process of 
democratization. A political crisis, for example, may force an authoritarian regime to share 
power. "A central requirement would appear to be that either the established elites within 
an authoritarian system or the successor elites after an authoritarian system collapses see their 
interests served by the introduction of democratic institutions."4 Yet, this approach is also 
problematic. Writing in 1 984, Hun�ington predicted that democratization had its best chances 
in South America, not in Leninist states in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. 5 
None of these approaches acknowledges in fact what has been most important to many 
of the opposition, reform movements themselves. For them, the first problem in Leninist 
states has not been economic, cultural, or political, but nothing less than what they could 
term "$piritual," i.e., what concerns people's deepest affections and passions, what gives their 
lives "ultimate" meaning and dignity. In consequence, these movements have also argued that 
fundamental moral concerns are at stake, i.e., how people express their loyalties and 
allegiances, how they trust and love and serve "the good." 
These movements did not precisely distinguish terms such as "spiritual" and "moral." 
They could easily appeal to either in articulating the basis of their opposition to the state. 
In their view, the Leninist state sought to deny any dimension to life outside the scope of its 
own ideology and power. Because the state masked this ideology in the language of 
instrumental reason, the movements sought to reclaim life's "spiritual" dimension, especially 
through the language of art, poetry, and philosophy. This language, they believed, grounded 
common moral responsibility· in universal, humanistic ideals of equality, toleration, and 
democratic participation. 
2 Ralf Dahrendorf, "Has the East Joined the West?" New Progressive Quarterly (Spring 1 990): 4 1 -
43. 
. 
. 3 See Boris Kagarlitsky, The Thinking Reed: Intellectuals and the Soviet State from 1 9 1 7  to the 
Present, trans. Brian Pearce (London: Verson, 1 988), 221 -222. 
4 Samual P. Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 
99 (Summer 1 984):2 14.  
5 Ibid., 2 1 5-2 1 7. 
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Those thinkers, such as Hannah Arendt, who have recognized this spiritual-moral 
dimension of democratization, have not, however, predicted the role that religion could play 
in articulating it. Indeed, they have tended either to ignore religion altogether or to associate 
it with traditional, authoritarian forces that emerge as the Party loses its hood over repressed 
cultural impulses.6 
In East Germany, however, a significant part of the opposition, reform movement 
emerged in a specifically theological context. During the 40 years of communist rule, the 
Evangelical Church, the nation's major religious body, represented the most important 
ideological and organizational alternative to the state. As political discontent grew, 
theologians, pastors, and people in church-related "alternative" groups played a leading role 
in organizing opposition and envisioning change. 
In this paper, a careful analysis and assessment of the theological-political rhetoric of the 
East German church demonstrates the validity of interpreting democratization in spiritual­
moral terms. Moreover, it shows the way in which explicitly religious language could 
provide people a conceptual framework for critiquing the spiritual impoverishment of the 
Leninist state. In East Germany, this language contributed powerful symbols, often drawn 
from Scripture, that helped people examine and challenge their own complicity in the system; 
it offered them, moreover, a moral vision of responsible political engagement. 
Many of the materials incorporating this distinctive East German rhetoric appeared only 
in underground publications. Though some have since appeared in West German collections, 
they are not widely known elsewhere in the West. As scholars begin to analyze the church's 
contributions to the democratization process in East Germany, and to the formulation of a 
specifically East German vision of a unified Germany, these materials, however, may shed 
valuable light. Indeed, they may eventually contribute as well to renewed thinking about a 
Christian understanding of democratic responsibility, of broader significance in both East 
and West. 
The Soiritual-Moral Crisis of the Leninist State 
A key theme of recent East German theological-political thought has been the spiritual­
moral crisis of the Leninist state. Especially representative is Heino Falcke, an East German 
theologian and churchman, whose writings reflect his close ties both to the world ecumenical 
movement and to the alternative groups that were instrumental in founding a political 
opposition. 
6 Hannah Arendt, "Epilogue: Reflections on the Hungarian Rovolution" in Arendt, Origins of 
Totalitarianism, 2nd, enl. ed. (New York: Meridian, 1 958), 480-5 10. Also, see Kagarlitsky, Thinking 
Reed, 22 1 .  
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Significantly, Falcke does not separate the spiritual-moral crisis. of the Leninist state 
from broader currents in the West. He sees an entire civilization deep in crisis. In part, the 
crisis has to do with the way in which people understand and exercise power. To many, 
power means domination and self -assertion; they try to control reality; they are obsessed with 
guaranteeing their security, even by means of force;. they are driven by acquisition, 
consumption, and accomplishment; they find identity and purpose by "delimiting" themselves 
(practicing Abgrenzung) from others, and by putting them down:7 
The result is two-fold. On the one hand, this kind of power threatens the very existence 
of the world. Falcke speaks of powers of death: the danger of nuclear war, the widening 
gap between the world's rich and poor, and the growing threat to the environment. On the 
other hand, this power, through exercised by humans, has caused them to feel profoundly 
powerless. They are spiritually and morally impoverished, "at their end," "discontented." In 
a scientific, technological age, alienation is a wide-spread phenomenon. Though frightened 
by issues of global survival, people feel powerless to respond.8 
Falcke locates the roots of this crisis in the basic human experience of "anxiety," i.e., 
people's insecurity and fearfulness about the value and worth of their lives. People turn to 
those "gods" that seem to promise power and security. In the modern world, people especially 
worship a scientific-technological rationality that promises power through knowledge and 
manipulation. Yet, the very reliance on science and technology has led to the modern crisis. 
Humans use science and technology in ways that dominate nature and each other. They 
understand their own worth in terms of "having," rather than "being," and are constantly 
driven to achieve more power and control. Such an ethic ultimately results in more anxiety, 
rather than relieving it.9 
This theological critique of the modern situation draws extensively on biblical themes. 
Falcke finds particular significance in Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, which asks people not 
·to be anxious about what they shall eat or drink or wear (Mt. 6:25-33). Jesus' critique of 
"having" expresses the same truth as Paul's critique of "achieving" (i.e., "works-righteousness." 
as developed by Lutheranism).10 
7 Heino Falcke, Mit Gott Schritt halten: Reden aund Aufsaetze eines Theologen in der DDR aus 
Zwanzig Jahren (Berlin: Wichern Verlag, 1 986), 99- 105, 1 64- 1 7 1 ,  285. 
8 Ibid., 95, 1 46, 1 57- 1 6 1 ,  1 7 1 - 1 72, 253, 286; and Heino Falcke, "Kirche Fuer andere' in der 
DDR," Dirche im Sozialismus 1 2  (April 1 986): 62. 
9 Falcke, Mit Gott Schritt halten, 1 5, 96, 99, 1 64- 1 65, 28 1 ;  and Heino Falcke, "Unsere Kirche 
und ihre Gruppen," Kirche im sozialismus 1 1  (August 1 985); 149. 
1° Falcke, Mit Gott Schritt halten, 290. 
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The spiritual-moral crisis of the modern world assumes a special shape, however, in the 
Leninist state. First, in making the "scientific worldview" its official ideology, the state 
denies the possibility of alternative ways of envisioning and constructing reality. Second, in 
asking people to work and sacrifice for the sake of a future kingdom of material wealth, it 
justifies socialist economic arrangements primarily in terms of their supposed ability to 
satisfy consumer needs. Third, its centralization of power hinders public participation and 
involvement in political life, resulting in pervasive social attitudes of apathy and 
irresponsibility .1 1  
In  sum, Falcke's theological critique of the modern situation in  general leads him to make 
a devastating critique of the Leninist state in particular. Not only does he argue that its key 
problem is its spiritual impoverishment, but he suggests how this spiritual impoverishment 
produces a citizenry that this morally indifferent and immature. When people understand 
life only in terms of a narrow, instrumental rationality, they fail to experience and exercise 
moral passion for any good higher than their own self-interest. They live only for the 
satisfaction of material needs and have little sense of a common good. In claiming that it 
alone can define and shape reality, the state disempowers people; indeed, it dehumanizes 
them in the sense of denying their capacity for responsible, moral action. Humans find 
themselves in a spiritual-moral crisis. The only way out, suggests Falcke, is a new kind of 
relationship with God, based on confession and repentance.12 
Alternative Groups and the Rhetoric of Crisis 
These themes also characterized the rhetoric of the alternative groups in the East German 
church. These groups, drawn to-and protected by-the church's "free space," originally 
gathered around issues of peace, justice, and environmental protection. Though experiencing 
considerable pressure and intimidation from the state, they eventually became the backbone 
of the political opposition that successfully challenged it.13 
From the beginning, these groups drew on the church's biblical, theological analysis of 
the modern situation to critique the spiritual-moral failure of the modern world. Ultimately, 
they argued, this crisis had to do with "the self -destructive form of civilization" common the 
11  Ibid., 95, I 7 I- I 72, 286. 
12 Ibid. 
13 For a good overview of the history of the alternative goups, see Pedro Ramet, Cross and 
Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press), 80-96. 
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East and West.14 They asserted that a rationalistic, deterministic ideology, with its roots in 
the modern world's narrow understanding of power, had become incapable of responding 
to threats of nuclear war, social injustice, and environmental pollution.15 
Yet, the groups went further than the church in applying the language of spiritual-moral 
crisis specifically to circumstances in East Germany. Their rhetoric, as recorded in their 
underground publications, was direct and sharp. 
The groups, for example, did not hesitate to apply their critique to the church itself. In 
the mid -1980s, some groups argued that the institutional church had become more concerned 
with maintaining itself than with serving people. - It was restricting every expression of 
spontaneity, self-initiative, and self-determination. It was failing to address the urgent, 
existential issues of the day--"the already occurring war (against people; through armament; 
against the environment and against the Two-thirds World)."16 Its structures and practices, 
such as the state's, were characterized by bureaucratization, incompetent leadership, 
disempowerment of people at the "base," wasteful expenditures on "objects of self­
representation," and a militaristic-type internal discipline.17 The church in appealing to 
"necessity"and "reality" to limit the groups' political engagement was simply reflecting the 
kind of deterministic rationalism typical of modernity.18 
The groups focused their critique, of course, on the East German state. By the late 
1 980's, they ha<;i identified "delimitation" (Abgrenzung), which Falcke treats theologically, as 
the nation's key political problem. They argued that the state--by restricting travel, contact 
with foreigners, and democratic participation--had delimited East Germany from the rest 
of the world, and especially the West. Moreover, the state was delimiting power to itself, 
as dramatically reflected in its manipulation of the 1 989 election returns. According to the 
groups, the experience of delimitation was making East German society morally sick. 
14 See Dir Opposition in der DDR: Entwuerfe fuer einen andernen Sozialismus, ed. Gerhard Rein 
(Berlin: Wichern Verlag, 1 988), 14 1 .  All translations are my own. 
15 Ehrhart Neubert, Reproduktion der Religion in der DDR Gesellschaft, mimeographed text 
(Berlin: Theologische Studienabteilung bein Bund der Evangelischen Kirchen in der DDR, 1986). A 
brief summary appears as "Religion in der DDR Gesellschaft," Kirche im Sozialismus 1 1  (June 1 985): 
99�103. 
-
16 "Kirchentang von unten: Fliegendes Papier 2," mimeographed text (dated May 1 987). 
17 Ibid. Also, see "Kirchentag von unten: Flugpapier 1 ," mimeographed text (dated June 1 987). 
The groups regularly charged the state with bureaucratism, corruption, conformism, dogmatism, 
arbitrariness, and condescension undermining public response to global, life-threatening issues and 
damaging the socialist promise. See Ueber das Nein hinaus: Aufrisse zwei, ed. Stephan Bickhardt, 
Reinhard Lampe, and Ludwig Mehlhorn, mimeographed text (dated October 8, 1 988), 32-33. 
18 "Kirchentag von unten: Flugpapier 1 ." 
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Isolated and powerless, people were living with apathy, resignation, stagnation, denial, and 
lack of responsibility. They were excessively narrow and incapable of openness. Social 
dialogue, communication, and cooperation had become increasingly impossible. State and 
society were characterized by growing fear of each other.19 
Though the groups were small, they helped articulate the underlying frustrations and 
resentments of the entire society. By the fall of 1 989, the sense of national crisis had become 
increasingly public and extreme. Thousands of East Germans were hoping to leave the 
country, and when the Hungarian government opened its western border, they saw their 
chance. In response to this mass exodus, the groups began to organize themselves as a 
national, political opposition. In their public statements, they frequently used words such 
as "loss" and "destruction" to justify their decision. Society was falling apart, with the danger 
that much good would be irretrievably lost. The social achievements of the past--social 
justice, solidarity in community--were threatened. State policies were destroying the 
environment, as well as the nation's cultural heritage. The moral foundations of society were 
also threatened, as evidenced by people's ever increasing lack of social responsibility. The 
government and the people mistrusted each other. Communication between them had 
completely broken down. 20 
Yet, not only church and state, but every individual had failed. In regard to the 
emigration issue, for example, Friedrich Schlorlemmer, an East German pastor active in the 
alternative scene, could speak of a mass psychosis: "We are sick and apparently contagious."21 
People had become so obsessed with the question of whether to leave or stay that they were 
focusing only on themselves rather than on more critical social and global issues.22 
In sum, the groups saw the state's rationalistic, deterministic ideology issuing in spiritual­
moral crisis. Spiritual impoverishment had in turn resulted in popular moral failure. People 
had no sense of a good beyond themselves. They had no moral commitment to changing 
their society; they were incapable of working for positive political change. Paradoxically, 
however, the groups argued that this crisis might actually begin to awaken people. It had 
reached the breaking point; it become personally and socially inescapable. Like Falcke, the 
19 See the statements of the "Initiativkreis 'Absage an die Praxis und Prinzip der Abgrenzung"' 
("lniatiative Group ' Repudiation of the Practice and Principle of Delimitation;") in Aufrisse: Absage 
an Praxis und Prinzip der Abgrenzung, ed. Stephan Bickhards, Reinhard Lampe, and Ludwig 
Melhorn, mimeographed text (from 1 987), 4-5; and Ueber das Nein hinaus. 1 9. The first also 
appeared in teh West as Rechte stroeme wie wasser: Ein Arbeitsbuch aus der DDR (Berlin: Wichern 
Verlag, 1 988). Also, see Die Opposition in der DDR, 65-66. 
20 See the statements of the new opposition parties in Die Opposition in der DDR, 13 ,  34, 59, 84. 
21 Ibid.,  1 40. 
22 Ibid. 
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groups therefore found biblical themes of confession and repentance helpful as they sought 
to articulate how spiritual-moral crisis might eventually lead to spiritual..:moral renewal. No 
longer could people simply blame the state for their problems. Every individual shared guilt 
for a preoccupation with personal self-realization that was ignoring, and contributing to, 
world disaster.23 Every individual was guiity of practicing delimitation and failing to 
respond to the larger problems at hand. Every individual had to reason to examine himself _ 
or herself. 2-' 
ResPonding to the Crisis 
This theological critique of the spiritual-moral crisis of the Leninist state· served as the 
basis for helping people examine and challenge their own complicity in the system. Drawing 
on powerful religious symbols, church leaders and thinkers developed a distinctive religious 
rhetoric of "peace, justice, and the integrity of the creation" to analyze the concrete political 
failings of the established order, to relate spiritual-moral renewal to universal, humanistic 
ideals, and to envision a new kind of nation and world. 25 
Falcke is again representative. He argues that, in the twentieth century, issues of-peace, 
justice, and the environment have become "confessional" because they have to do with the 
very survival of the world. God's word has a contribution to make such a world, nothing less 
than a hope for its survivai.26 
With the help of Scripture, Falcke develops a social ethic corresponding to this hope. 
God's word is Christ; who rules all creation. Christ has entered the human condition, 
suffered its depths, and been raised to new life. Through his resurrection, his example and 
teaching (summarized, for Falcke, especially well in the Sermon on the Mount) have become 
authoritative expressions of the new life available to all.27 
This christological orientation has important implications for the way in which people 
can understand and live their lives. Christ is present to every human. Every human 
therefore has the possibility of encountering Christ and his love. In this encounter, humans 
23 Ibid., 139-141. 
24 The groups could appeal to Falcke himself, as did the initiative group against delimitation. 
See Aufrisse, 83. Also, see Schorlemmer's remarks in Ueber das Nein hinaus, 32-33; and in Die 
Opposition in der DDR, 140-141 
25 In the meantime, peace, justice and the integrity of the creation have also become central 
emphases of the World Council of Churches. 
26 Falcke, Mit Gott Schritt halten, 146-147, 282. 
27 Ibid., 90. 
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become receivers. They discover that their value and worth are ultimately not an 
achievement, but a gift. Christ's love challenges and changes their lives. It drives them to 
"crisis" and "repentance" (Umkehr, i.e., turning around). They are liberated from anxiety and 
therefore from obsession with power and from a world driven by "having," success, and 
economic growth. 28 
Christian freedom implies social responsibility. Indeed, the Christian ethic is one of 
"higher responsibility." "Instead of wanting to replace God, humans can correspond to God 
in answering him as liberated, responsible partners."29 Christian freedom included freedom 
for others and creation. This sense of responsibility is fed by hope. Because Christ has 
entered history, the possibility of conversion and change is not only personal, but social. 
Christians see history as "an alterable, open process moving towards the kingdom of God."30 
"We then see our world no longer as something set, causally determined . . . and 
unimproveable."31 Even when they see little visible success, Christians believe that they can 
change the world and that the world can surprise them with new possibilities. They live in 
trust and with a willingness to risk experimentation.32 
Christian responsibility is also characterized by commitment to community because "in 
corresponding to God, humans are relational beings."33 In describing the nature of this 
community, Falcke appeals to two important biblical symbols: "covenant" and "the kingdom 
of God." Both terms bear theological significance. First, they express that God initiates this 
community.34 Second, they express that Christ, through his life, death, and resurrection, 
28 Ibid., 92, 99-100, 165-169; Falcke, "'Kirche fuer andere,"' 60; and Falcke's comments in Die 
Opposition in der DDR, 226. 
29 Falcke, Mit Gott Schritt halten, 286. 
30 Heino Falcke, "Neues Denken," Kirche im Sozialismus 13 (April 1987): 62. 
31 Falcke, Mit Got Schritt halten, 94. 
32 Ibid., 14, 17-18, 22, 96, 175; and Falcke, "Neues Denken," 62. For what I ahve translated as 
"responsibility," Falcke uses both Verantwortung and Muendigkeit. The latter implies maturity, 
"coming of age." East Germans often complained that the state, by speaking and acting on their 
behalf (Bevormundung), denied them this status. Muendigkeit also alludes to Bonoheffer's idea of 
a world "come of age." 
33 Falcke, Mit Gott Schritt halten, 286. 
34 For example, Falcke asserts that the peace we make lives out of the peace we receive (from 
God). See Falcke, Mit Gott Schritt halten, I 13, 135. 
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makes this community a real historical possibility. Third, they express that every human 
effort to realize this community needs renewal and correction.35 
The covenant and kingdom help express the community's commitment to peace, justice, 
and protection of the creation, and to their integral interconnection. In creating covenant, 
God gives peace, "shalom," which the Old Testament prophets describe as living, sound, and 
therefore just relationship. In the Book of Deuteronomy, God commands Israel to observe 
every seventh year as a year of covenant renewal and of "remission." Debts are forgiven, 
and relationships characterized by unjust dependency are annulled. Other parts of the Old 
Testament connect covenant to the integrity of the creation. The year of covenant renewal 
is the sabbatical year. The land is allowed to rest.36 
These concerns find new expression and depth in the "new covenant" established by 
Christ. Through the Lord's Supper, Christians participate in the "new covenant." They 
repudiate false gods and celebrate God' liberating power. They become a community. The 
Lord's Supper speaks to issues of peace, justice, and the environment by, for example, 
symbolizing the priority of relationship over consumption.37 
Peace, justice, and protection of the creation as characteristics of community are also 
implied in the symbol of the "kingdom," which the Sermon on the Mount explicates especially 
well. The promise of God's kingdom frees people from anxious worry about themselves. 
First, they are able to practice peace (expressed in loving enemies). Such peace is not simply 
an absence of war, nor an enforced state of security, but vital, positive community. Second, 
they are able to practice justice (expressed in the beatitudes, which bless the poor and 
suffering). Such justice demands a thinking that begins from the perspective of those who 
suffer, including those who suffer from structures and practices that could eventually 
threaten humanity itself. Falcke emphasizes solidarity with the poor and the Third World. 
He calls, moreover, for measuring the impact of science and technology on those who suffer 
their impact, for example, the inhabitants of industrial areas. Third, the promise of God's 
kingdom frees people, in their relations with nature, to practice a "solidarity in conflict," 
35 Ibid., 125, 141 . Repentance, therefore, is not once and for all, but an ongoing process. People 
must ever again confess their complicity in the world's problems and make a new beginning. Every 
from of human liberation and community is temporary and incomplete, produces new ideologies and 
forms of enslavement, and needs renewal and correction through God's offer of freedom in Christ. 
See Die Opposition in der DDR, 223. 
36 Falcke, Mit Gott Schritt halten, 1 36- 1 37. 
37 Ibid., 29, 1 39, I 73.  
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which, though unable to eliminate human manipulation of nature, can limit it and make 
humans more sensitive to their impact on the environment.38 
Falcke believes that the church can inspire the world to adopt this ethic only if Christians 
first exemplify the biblical understanding of liberation and community in their own way of 
life. To realize peace, justice, and protection of the creation, the church itself must have 
democratic structures and practices. Falcke therefore asks the church, first, to encourage 
openness. Such a church will not be elitist or exclusive. It will promote openness of 
discussion and information. It will be "for others," especially those who experience suffering, 
including social and ideological marginalization. Just as Jesus associated with outcasts, 
Christians will seek to exercise love beyond every social boundary (Abgrenzung). Their 
"covenant" will be open to all. The Lord's Supper, correspondingly, will also be open to all 
who seek its promise of peace. Second, the church will encourage participation "from below." 
It will bear with plurality and allow experimentation. It will emphasize consensus and 
domination-free communication. It will be critical of authoritarian arrangements. It will be 
open to renewal from the base. Third, the church will seek binding, but tolerant, 
relationship. It will practice solidarity and reconciliation.39 
The church will also promote these democratic characteristics in society as a whole. In 
terms of openness, it will encourage widening the public realm. It will oppose a state policy 
of "delimitation" (Abgrenzung) based on friend/foe thinking. It will promote contact with 
others and the idea of a community of peoples. In terms of participation, it will support 
involvement "from below," decentralization, and democratic structures that check power. 
It will seek a politics that activates responsibility in all its citizens. In terms of binding 
relationship, it will encourage a "socialist" alternative that recognizes the primacy of social 
justice.40 
In sum, Falcke draws extensively on Jesus' example and teaching, as well as on biblical 
concepts of covenant and kingdom, to envision the church as an "alternative community." 
Through his resurrection, Jesus encounters every human being and offers the world peace, 
justice, and the integrity of the creation as real possibilities, not just distant ideals. Their 
realization, however, depends on humans first experiencing crisis in such a way that they 
38 Ibid., I 00, I 05, 117, 166, 17 4. Also, see Die Opposition in der DDR, 226. Falcke ties justice 
to the integrity of the creation. The kind of consumerism that leads to unjust distribution of the 
world's resources and ecological devastation can only be transcended if people find their lives 
fulfilled beyond it. See Falcke, Mit Gott Schritt halten, 171. 
39 Ibid., 16, 25-26, 100, 104, 114-116, 123, 128, 135, 139, 174-175; and Falcke, "Neues Denken," 
63. 
4° Falcke, Mit Gott Schritt halten, 25, 96, 128, 165, 172, 286; and Die Opposition in der DDR, 
226, 229. 
I I  
repent, i.e., that they relinquish their obsession with "having and "achieving," and assume a 
higher responsibility for their society and world. 
Alternative Grouos and Biblical Imagery 
The church-related alternative groups also appealed to many of these basic biblical 
themes as they coined a distinctive, oppositional political rhetoric. As with Falcke, the 
emphasis fell on the way in which confession and repentance could become the basis of a 
"higher responsibility" to peace, justice, and the integrity of the creation. 
Jesus' example and teaching was central to these groups. Typical of their rhetoric is the 
assertion that Jesus comes "from below." Born in a stall, he belongs to the lowest social class 
and lives in opposition to all forms of political, religious, and social domination. His practice 
of forgiveness offers people freedom from the culture's legalistic morality. He founded a 
liberated, liberating community characterized by domination-free communication, 
compassion, solidarity, equality, and responsibility. His sayings about work (e.g.,  the parable 
of the laborers in the vineyard, Mt. 20) challenge the presuppositions of a competitive, 
achievement-oriented society. Moreover, he appears neither to have money nor to pay taxes. 
Similarly, his "politics" are apparently "anti-politics," a complete rejection of state power 
(Mk. 1 0:42).41 
At times, this rhetoric depicts Jesus as nothing less than an alternative group member. 
"If we were to translate the charges against Jesus into the language of today's laws, they 
might be: state-hostile agitation, state-hostile group building [a reference to two East 
German laws to which the state appealed to threaten alternative groups]."42 
This Jesus calls people to repentance,i.e., to changing their ways and opposing every form 
of evil and injustice. He himself constantly challenges every social limit and cultural barrier 
(Abgrenzung) by going to the weak and marginalized. Christian faith today also seeks ways 
of solidarity and reconciliation "across borders, beyond limits." Christians break taboos and 
speak the truth. They call for openness, understanding, and trust in place of delimitation. 
By repudiating the state policy of delimitation, the church would speak a "liberating word" 
on behalf of the marginalized, promote free and responsible citizenship, and witness to 
peace. Drawing on the Sermon on the Mount, Christians see that their "first duty . . .  is to 
overcome enmity . . .  enmity that has found political form in the practice and principle of 
41 "Kirchentag von unten: Fliegendes Papier 4," mimeographed text (dated June 1 987). 
42 Ibid. 
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[the state policy of] delimitation."43 In a world threatened by destruction, to follow Christ, 
in opposition to delimitation, is to stand for life. Repudiating the state policy of delimitation 
is a "confessional" matter. Through practicing repentance, people assume responsibility for 
radical political reform and for new moral values equally emphasizing world peace, 
environmental protection, and Third World justice.44 
The alternative groups never simply called for individual freedoms and rights. Rather, 
freedom was joined to responsibility for their society and world. Only through broad public 
participation could the state address problems of peace, justice, and the integrity of the 
creation.45 Moreover, the groups linked to the survival of the nation to the very survival of 
the world. Problems of peace, justice, and nature were not merely East German but global. 
By addressing the East German situation, people could also make a global contribution. By 
opposing the state, they could reclaim their "peace potentiality," which, one group argued, 
the world would need, if it were to survive.46 By acting on a new vision of peace, justice, 
and the integrity of the creation, East Germans could address the very crisis of modernity, 
which the Leninist state has embodied rather than resolved. 
Even though the rhetoric of the groups became more narrowly political and less explicitly 
biblical as they became opposition political parties, it continued to reflect elements of the 
powerful social vision. All the new opposition parties had a vision of a new kind of society. 
They sometimes saw themselves as representing a new socialism, a necessary alternative to 
Western consumerist societies, a "survivable community" in a time of global dangers. Several 
expressed their commitment to building a "community of solidarity" (solidarische 
Gemeinschaft). In some cases, they also emphasized the need for a new personal lifestyle, 
for the sake of the social good and the natural environment.47 
The words "social" (relating to social justice) and "ecological" appeared with particular 
frequency and emphasis in the political rhetoric of the new opposition parties.48 ("Peace," 
the major issue of the early 1 980s, though less emphasized, undoubtedly because of the 
43 Aufrisse, 7. Also, see pp. 3-4, 1 3, 1 8- 1 9. 
44 Ibid., 3, 1 7 ,  Also, see Ueber das Nein hinaus, 32-33; and Die Opposition in der DDR, 149. 
45 Neubert, Reproduktion der Religion; compare the rhetoric of the new opposition parties in 
Die Opposition in der DDR, 60-61 , 69, 85-86. 
46 Aufrisse, 9. 
47 Die Opposition in der DDR, 30, 34, 43, 59-60, 65, 85. 
48 Moreover, "social" and "ecological" are often highlighted together. One opposition group 
labelled itself "Demokratischer Aufbruch -- sozial, oekologisch" (Democratic Awakening -- social, 
ecological). The Social Democratic Party called for "an ecologically oriented social democracy." See 
Die Opposition in der DDR, 86. 
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relaxing relations between the superpowers, remained important for characterizing defense 
matters and international relations.)'�9 Interestingly, the economic area, �bile addressed, did 
not initially play a major role in the oppositional rhetoric. Though the economy had many 
problems and inefficiencies, the East German standard of living was relatively high. 
Economic reform would be primarily for the sake of expanding individual freedoms and 
protecting social and ecological priorities. 50 
In sum, the idea of an "alternative community," which found considerable development 
in East German theological-political thought, also became the central focus of the alternative 
and opposition groups. Though little interested in the particular theology underlying the 
church's social vision, they did appropriate key biblical images and themes, especially those 
relating to the example and teaching of Jesus. Even as the groups left the roof of the church 
and formed a public opposition, they continued to envision an alternative politics that would 
build a society similar in character to that envisioned by the church. Confession and 
repentance would become the basis for a higher responsibility both to the nation and to all 
mankind. 
Wider lmnlications and Annlications 
The language of spiritual-moral crisis, confession, repentance, and higher responsibility 
also finds significant parallels in the opposition, reform movements that have emerged in 
other Leninist states, though these movements have not often appealed to explicitly religious 
language. A number of prominent East Bloc opposition leaders, for example, have argued 
that the crisis of the Leninist system is primarily spiritual-moral. People trade truth and 
freedom for material security. They submit to the state ideology not out of conviction, but 
out of a need to deceive themselves about the emptiness and crassness of their lives. They 
learn to live in a lie. 
Vaclav Havel especially has given forceful articulation to the causes and consequences 
of this way of life. 
The profound crisis of human identity brought on by living within a lie, a 
crisis which in turn makes such a life possible, . . .  appears, among other things, as 
a deep moral crisis in society. A person who has been seduced by the consumer value 
system, whose identity is dissolved in an amalgam of the accoutrements of mass 
civilization, and who has no roots in the order of being, no sense of responsibility 
for anything higher than his or her own personal survival, is a demoralized person. 
49 Ibid., 1 4, 62. 
50 Ibid., 1 6, 36, 63-64, 87.  
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The system depends on this demoralization, deepens it, is in fact a projection of it 
into society.51  
In response, these movements, like the one in East Germany, have called for spiritual­
moral renewal. This "spiritual-moral imperative" has taken different social forms, however. 
In China, the tone of the students involved in the Tianenman Square protests was 
nationalistic. They saw the Chinese government as caught in feudalistic patterns and unable 
to advance national interests. They wanted to save the nation. 52 Boris Kagarlitsky, a leading 
Soviet intellectual and dissident, has called for reform for the sake of saving Russian 
"culture" and renewing the humanistic vision that he finds in Marx. 53 
In other cases, intellectuals, in a way more similar to East German theological-political 
rhetoric, have linked spiritual-moral renewal with the very salvation of civilization and the 
world. Fang Lizhi, the Chinese physicist and dissidents, has asked intellectuals to have a 
strong sense of social responsibility and concern for peoples's physical as well as spiritual­
moral needs. 54 Havel has called for a new sense of social responsibility in a world threatened 
by scientific-technological domination. 55 
In calling for social responsibility, these leaders have also articulated a distinctive notion 
of national identity. In contrast to those who would dismiss Leninism as an alien ideology 
imposed on the nation from without, they have called for national repentance, i.e., 
acknowledgement of the entire nation's complicity in the Leninist system. In contrast to 
those who would support a narrow, even reactionary nationalism, they have called for 
national commitment to universal, humanistic ideals. 
This brief review demonstrates that religious language was not the only language that 
could help articulate the spiritual-moral concerns of the opposition, reform movements. The 
fact that religious language did, however, play such a significant role in East Germany 
undoubtedly had to do with the unique position of the church as a "free space" in which 
alternative groups could gather. Indeed, as the groups left the church and were able to 
organize as a public, political opposition, they too appealed to more general moral 
formulations to articulate their concerns. 
51 Vaclav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against 
the State in Central-Eastern Europe, ed. Vaclav Havel (London: Hutchinson, 1 988), 45. 
52 See Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1 989 Chinese Democracy Movement, 
ed. Han Minzhu (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1 990). 
53 Kagarlitsky, The Thinking Reed. 
54 See Ge Sheng, "Fang Lizhi -- A Model of Chinese Intellectual," China Spring Digest 
(March/ April I 987): 22, 23. 
55 Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 89-92. 
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Conclusion 
This linking of spiritual-moral crisis, confession, repentance, and higher responsibility 
can make a significant contribution to Christian social ethics in both East and West. For East 
Bloc thinkers such as Havel have been quick to suggest that the West suffers under its own 
forms of spiritual impoverishment and moral irresponsibility.56 As the two Germanies 
united, East German church leaders too rearticulated these themes as their distinctive 
contribution to a vision of a new Germany. 57 
In sum, East German theological-political thought suggests three key points. First, 
Christian social ethics will begin with an analysis of the spiritual impoverishment of the 
modern situation. It will attend to the degree to which mass consumer society makes 
"religious" claims, i.e., emphasizes "having" and "achieving" as solutions to anxiety and 
powerlessness, while in fact creating new forms of anxious dependency and misuse of power. 
It will critique all ideologies that reduce the meaning of life to a narrow understanding of 
human reason and control. 
Second, Christian social ethics will call people to confession and repentance. Every 
person in a mass consumer society has succumbed to ideologies of "having" and "achieving" 
at the expense of peace, justice, and the integrity of the creation. Through confession and 
repentance, one can seek a new way of life. One can become responsible to a good higher 
than self -interest or group-interest. 
Third, Christian social ethics will contribute to the building of an alternative community 
capable of responding to problems of peace, justice, and the integrity of the creation. This 
task begins in the church but has implications for society as a whole. In either case, 
democratic values, such as openness and participation are not ends in themselves but means 
to promoting a higher responsibility for life--individually, socially, globally. 
Moreover, East German theological-political thought suggests the degree to which 
Scripture can help describe the nature of this kind of Christian democratic responsibility. 
It especially reclaims the Sermon on the Mount and interprets it as a social rather than simply 
sectarian vision. 
This remarkable vision that emerged in East German theological-political thought 
remains a valuable resource to Christian social ethics. Christians in the West would do well 
56 See Vaclav Havel, "Help the Soviet Union on its Road to Democracy," Vital Speeches of the 
Day ( 1 990): 330. 
57 See, for example, Christof Ziemer, "Der Luege widerstehen, die Wahrheit Ieben," Die Union 
Tageszeitung (July 2, 1 990): 4. 
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not to forget too quickly the charismatic images of people dancing on the Wall. In a time in 
which Americans hear almost exclusively about economic and political reasons for social 
change, East Germans and other Eastern Europeans would remind us that history also lias a 
spiritual-moral dimension. Indeed, if they are correct, the very survival of the world--East 
and West, North and South--depends on our reclaiming it. 
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